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Scientific abstract 
It has been strongly argued that atypical cognitive processes in autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) contribute to the expression of behavioural symptoms. Comprehensive investigation 
of these claims has been limited by small and unrepresentative sample sizes and the absence 
of wide-ranging task batteries. The current study investigated the cognitive abilities of 100 
adolescents with ASD (mean age = 15 years 6 months), using 10 tasks to measure the 
domains of theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF). We used structural equation 
modelling as a statistically robust way of exploring the associations between cognition and 
parent-reported measures of social communication and restricted and repetitive behaviours 
(RRBs). We found that ToM ability was associated with both social communication 
symptoms and RRBs. EF was a correlate of ToM but had no direct association with parent-
reported symptom expression. Our data suggest that in adolescence ToM ability, but not EF, 
is directly related to autistic symptom expression. 
Lay Summary 
The behaviours that are common to autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have been linked to 
differences in thinking ability. We assessed autistic adolescents and found that social 
communication difficulties and the presence of restricted and repetitive behaviours related to 
difficulties in understanding other peoples’ minds (theory of mind). In contrast, these 
behaviours were not associated with the general thinking abilities involved in planning and 
executing tasks (executive function).  
Keywords: adolescents, executive functioning, restricted/repetitive behaviours, social 
cognition & theory of mind 
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Introduction 
The causes of the behavioural symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), which include 
social communication difficulties and restricted and repetitive behaviours (RRBs) (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013), remain elusive. Recognition that these behavioural symptoms 
are continuously distributed in the general population and can occur in isolation has meant 
that focus is on identifying multiple causes, which likely vary across the autistic population 
(e.g. Constantino 2011; Happé et al. 2006). An important consideration in unpicking the 
complex constellation of biological and environmental influences on autistic symptoms is the 
role of cognition. It has been proposed that multiple cognitive difficulties are relevant to ASD 
and that they may have distinct interactions with different behavioural symptoms (Happé and 
Ronald 2008; Happé et al. 2006). Characterising cognitive-behaviour associations in ASD is 
an important step towards enhanced understanding and better targeted interventions. 
The two cognitive accounts of ASD that have received most attention are theory of 
mind (ToM; e.g. Frith et al. 1991) and executive function (EF; e.g. Pennington et al. 1997; 
Russell 1997). ToM, or mentalising, is the ability to infer the mental states of other people 
and to use this information to predict behaviour. Difficulties in passing classic measures of 
ToM,  the most common of which are false belief tasks, are well documented in ASD (see 
Frith 2012). False belief tasks ask direct questions about the mental states of others, although 
they also require competency in a range of other cognitive skills, such as inhibiting reality 
and response selection (e.g. Baillargeon et al. 2010).The ToM account, at least as a complete 
explanation, has been challenged by evidence that some individuals with ASD can pass false 
belief tasks (see Boucher 2012) as well as more advanced ToM assessments (e.g. Scheeren et 
al. 2013). However, verbal ability is a consistent correlate of ToM (Ronald et al. 2006; 
Scheeren et al. 2013) and one interpretation is that verbally able autistic individuals ‘hack 
out’ mentalising explanations when given time and structure but this ability does not 
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withstand the complexities of everyday life, where mentalising has to be intuitive, fast and 
reflexive (Happé 1995). Indeed, real life mentalising requires attention to relevant social 
detail, which may not be forthcoming in ASD (Chevallier et al. 2012). More recent studies 
measuring implicit mentalising (e.g. spontaneous looking patterns that reflect intuitive 
tracking of another person’s belief state) are clear in documenting difficulties in adults with 
ASD, despite competency on classic explicit mentalising tasks (e.g. direct questioning about 
another person’s belief state) (e.g. Senju et al. 2009). Some tests of mentalising require 
emotion recognition to infer mental states (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), and this can also be 
impaired in ASD. 
Intuitively, an association would be expected between mentalising difficulties and a 
range of atypical social communicative behaviours characteristic of ASD. Indeed, 
correlations between ToM and social communiation have been identified (e.g. Ames and 
White 2011; Joseph and Tager-Flusberg 2004; Lerner et al. 2011; Nagar Shimoni et al. 2012), 
although not consistently (e.g. Cantio et al. 2016; Pellicano et al. 2006; Scheeren et al. 2013; 
Travis et al. 2001; Wilson et al. 2014). In contrast, the ToM account is less able to explain 
RRBs (Brunsdon and Happé 2014) and this relationship is less studied. However, valid 
theoretical links between RRBs and ToM can be drawn. For example, RRBs could 
conceivably alleviate anxiety that is elicited in challenging social situations. Further, limited 
insight into how the self is being perceived could serve to facilitate the development and 
maintenance of RRBs.  Previous research has largely reported no significant associations 
between RRBs and ToM (Cantio et al. 2016; Pellicano et al. 2006; White et al. 2009; Wilson 
et al. 2014). However, Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) reported a correlation between 
RRBs and ToM that was significant when nonverbal mental age, although not language 
ability, was controlled. In addition, Nagar Shimoni et al. (2012) found a correlation between 
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mentalising ability and the observed presence of stereotypic and limited interests, although 
there were no significant correlations with parent reported RRBs.  
Whereas the ToM hypothesis is specific to social cognition, the EF hypothesis 
proposes domain-general cognitive difficulties in ASD (Pennington et al. 1997; Russell 
1997). EFs encompass a range of interacting cognitive processes, subserved by the frontal 
lobes, which are particularly relevant to successful engagement in complex, novel and goal-
oriented behaviours. Evidence of difficulties across the breadth of EFs, including planning, 
inhibition, cognitive flexibility, generativity and working memory, have all been reported in 
ASD (see Hill 2004). It has been proposed that EFs, particularly monitoring actions and 
acting with volition, are prerequisites for self-awareness and therefore for mentalising 
(Russell 1997). Impaired EFs are subsequently hypothesised to limit the ability of individuals 
with ASD to reflect on own and others’ mental states (Pennington et al. 1997; Russell 1997). 
This position has been bolstered by evidence that early EF ability predicts later proficiency in 
ToM in children with ASD (Pellicano 2010). A more prosaic explanation is that adequate EFs 
are necessary for coping with theory of mind tests, which are inherently cognitively 
demanding and require inhibition of reality/true beliefs (see Moses 2001). However, this 
account fares less well when considering difficulties with implicit mentalising, where 
executive demands are limited. Another interpretation is that EFs facilitate social interaction, 
thereby supporting the development of mentalising ability through exposure to relevant social 
exchange (e.g. Hughes 1998). Regardless, accounts of EF and social communication in ASD 
generally conceive of executive difficulties as having a cascading impact on mentalising 
ability, which is a more specific indicator of ASD. Evidence of significant association 
between poor EF and impairment in social communication exists (e.g. Dichter et al. 2009; 
Kenworthy et al. 2009; McEvoy et al. 1993) but null findings are more common (e.g. Cantio 
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et al. 2016; D'Cruz et al. 2013; Joseph and Tager-Flusberg 2004; Landa and Goldberg 2005; 
Liss et al. 2001; Reed et al. 2013; Yerys et al. 2009).  
Impairment in EFs has also been proposed to be functionally associated with RRBs. 
For example, difficulty in generating new ideas could lead to rigid routines and difficulty in 
managing when routine is disrupted (Turner 1997). This hypothesis has been supported by 
evidence of correlations between EF and RRBs in children with ASD (e.g. D'Cruz et al. 
2013; Kenworthy et al. 2009; Lopez et al. 2005; Miller et al. 2015; Mosconi et al. 2009; 
Mostert-Kerckhoffs et al. 2015; Reed et al. 2013; South et al. 2007; Turner 1997; Yerys et al. 
2009), although the finding is not universal (Cantio et al. 2016; Dichter et al. 2009; Faja and 
Dawson 2014; Joseph and Tager-Flusberg 2004; Liss et al. 2001; Pellicano et al. 2006; 
Wilson et al. 2014). 
A cluster of studies have explored cognition in ASD across domains and using 
multiple measures (Brunsdon et al. 2015; Cantio et al. 2016; Kimhi et al. 2014; Lai et al. 
2012; Lam 2013; Losh et al. 2009; Narzisi et al. 2013; Pellicano et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 
2014; Yang et al. 2009). Direct attempts to correlate symptom severity with performance in 
specific cognitive domains were only examined in three of the studies and did not yield 
significant associations (Cantio et al. 2016; Pellicano et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 2014).  
Thus, although there are compelling theoretical accounts of close association between 
cognition and behaviour in ASD, indeed these theories and suppositions drive the fertile 
investigation into the cognitive profile in ASD, the evidence base is surprisingly limited and 
contradictory. Here we report data from 100 adolescents (aged 14-16 years) with ASD who 
completed a battery of ToM and EF measures. Measurement of social communication and 
RRB symptoms was obtained via parent report. Critically, our sample spanned the range of 
testable participants (full scale IQ range 50-119), enabling a representative sample that was 
not confined to intellectually able participants. The sample size and multiple assessments 
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allowed us to explore the theorized associations between cognition and behaviour using 
structural equation modelling (SEM). Given the limitations and varied findings of previous 
research, our approach was agnostic, with our initial model predicting that both cognitive 
factors would be associated with both behavioural factors. The identification of the cognitive 
impairments that are associated with core autistic behaviours will provide a test of the ‘real 
life validity’ of the putative cognitive phenotypes of ASD.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred adolescents (91 male) with a consensus clinical ICD-10 (World Health 
Organisation, 1993) diagnosis of ASD were tested. Participants were from the Special Needs 
and Autism Project (SNAP; see Baird et al. 2006; Charman et al. 2011) and were on average 
15 years 6 months (SD= 6 months; range 14 years 8 months – 16 years 9 months) at the time 
of testing. Participants had to have been able to successfully engage with the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III UK; Wechsler 1992) during the previous phase of 
SNAP, when they were between 9 and 10 years old. Further details on diagnostic procedure 
and sample characteristics can be found in Charman et al. (2011). The study was approved by 
the South East Research Ethics Committee (05/MRE01/67). 
Materials and procedure 
Participation involved completing a large battery of tasks, only some of which are reported 
here (see Charman et al. 2011). Testing took place in a quiet testing area and tasks were 
presented in one of four carefully selected orders. The battery was completed over two days 
of testing, with a median gap of 21 days (range 1-259 days) between sessions. Seventeen 
participants required a third day of testing to complete the battery.  
Cognitive tasks 
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Tasks are summarised in Table 1, and comprehensively described in the online 
supplementary materials. Task selection aimed at measuring ToM and EFs as broadly as 
possible, enabling a wide source of variance. ToM measures included: (i) False belief, as the 
gold standard measure of mentalising, (ii) Strange stories, as a general measure of mental 
state understanding, requiring understanding of the intent of one character to manipulate the 
mental state of another, (iii) Frith-Happé animations, as a general measure of mental state 
understanding, requiring attribution of intentions based only on movement patterns, (iv) 
Reading the mind in the eyes task – Children’s version (RMET), as a perception based 
measure of recognising psychological states (including emotions). EF tasks included: (i) 
Opposite worlds, as a measure of inhibition of a verbal response, (ii) Card sort, as a measure 
of cognitive set-shifting/flexibility, (iii) Category fluency, as a verbal measure of 
generativity, (iv) Design fluency, as a non-verbal measure of generativity, (v) Backwards 
digit span, as a measure of working memory, (vi) Planning drawing, as a measure of visuo-
spatial planning. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
IQ and language 
Verbal, performance and full-scale IQ was measured using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale 
of Intelligence-UK (WASI; Wechsler 1999). A measure of language was obtained using the 
electronic version of the Test for the Reception of Grammar (TROG-E; Bishop 2005). This 
task assesses receptive grammar by requiring participants to choose pictures that correspond 
to sentences of increasing grammatical complexity. Both tasks used standard scores. 
Parent-report measures of ASD symptoms 
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Social communication symptoms were measured using the social awareness, social cognition, 
social communication and social motivation raw subscores, from the Social Responsiveness 
Scale (SRS; e.g. Constantino and Gruber 2005).  The SRS rates behaviours from 1 (not true) 
to 4 (almost always true), with a mean calculated for each subscale. RRBs were measured 
with the Repetitive Behavior Scale-Revised (RBS-R; Bodfish et al. 2000), using five 
empirically derived behaviour subscales: stereotypy, self-injurious, compulsive, 
ritualistic/sameness and restricted (Lam and Aman 2007). The RBS-R rates behaviours on a 0 
(behaviour does not occur) – 3 (behaviour occurs and is a severe problem) scale, with the 
mean score for each subscale calculated.  
Analysis 
Data preparation and descriptive and correlational analyses were carried out in Stata 12 
(StataCorp 2011) and SPSS 20.0 (IBMCorp 2011), while SEM was conducted in MPlus 7 
(Muthén and Muthén 1998-2012). Variables were assessed for skewness and Box-Cox 
transformed, where appropriate. Transformed variables were Opposite Worlds, Card sort, and 
the RBS-R subscales stereotypy, self-injurious, and compulsive behaviours. All cognitive 
variables for SEM were treated so that a higher score indicated worse performance, this 
meant the ToM variables and the category fluency, design fluency, digit span, and planning 
drawing variables were all reverse scored. Collection of the complete dataset was not 
possible for a variety of reasons including time restrictions, participant engagement and 
ability, and parent availability for questionnaire completion. We dealt with missing data by 
using multiple imputation (see Schafer 1999) within MPlus and imputed 50 datasets for each 
analysis. Multiple imputation that handles missing data by creating replicates of an original 
dataset and replacing the missing data in each with imputed values. Analysis is then carried 
out on each dataset and averaged to create a single output (see Sterne et al. 2009). Descriptive 
and correlational data presented are based on the true dataset.  
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SEM enabled theoretical models of the interrelationships between multiple measures 
to be tested and compared. The structural component of SEM assesses the relations between 
latent variables and it is therefore essential that these latent variables are psychometrically 
sound (see Byrne 2011). Preliminary confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were used to create 
two measurement models, which established the latent variables of ToM, EF (cognitive 
CFA), and social communication and RRBs (behavioural CFA) (Step 1). The second phase 
(Step 2-5)  used an incremental approach to explore the structural relationships between 
cognition and behaviour by imposing a regression structure on the confirmed latent variables. 
In Step 2 we focused on the direct and basic regressions between ToM and behaviour and EF 
and behaviour in two separate models. Step 3 progressed to anlaysing the relationship 
between cognition and behaviour in a combined model. This meant cognition-behaviour 
associations were explored in a context in which both types of cognition were controlled. 
Step 4 repeated the structure of the combined model but additionally regressed each latent 
variable onto a measure of receptive language (TROG-E). This meant that patterns of 
association could be explored in a context that controlled for the effects of receptive language 
ability on task performance.  Step 5 replicated Step 4 but regressed each latent variable onto a 
measure of IQ rather than language.  Classic model generating frameworks (Jöreskog 1993) 
systematically drop non-significant paths, starting with the most non-significant, to identify 
the most parsimonious model. However, we considered it important to maintain paths that 
could potentially confound cognitive-behaviour associations, even if non-significant. The 
model estimator was maximum likelihood. Model fit was assessed using the comparative fit 
index (CFI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). A CFI of ≥.95 and a 
RMSEA of ≤.08 were considered suggestive of a reasonable fitting model (see Byrne 2011).  
In cases where model fit did not improve, the removal of consecutive paths was assessed 
using chi-square; a significant worsening of model fit was indicated by a drop of  ≥3.84. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics are illustrated in Table 2. Participant performance was heterogeneous 
and used the full range of the scales. Correlations between tasks and behaviours are shown in 
Tables 3-4 at the item level, with correlations between individual cognitive tasks presented in 
the supplementary materials (Supplementary Table 1). For all correlations, if the data were 
Box-Cox transformed for the modelling then this transformation was used.  
Insert Table 2 about hereSEM  
Step 1: Initial CFA measurement models 
The cognitive CFA model fit was only moderate (χ2(34)=67.02, p<.001; CFI=.861; 
RMSEA=.099) but with all variables significantly loading onto their latent factor (all 
p<.001). The correlation between factors was high ( .87 (p<.001)). The behavioural CFA 
model showed good model fit (χ2(26)=40.01, p=.04; CFI=.966; RMSEA=.076), all variables 
significantly loaded onto their latent factor (all p<.01), and the correlation between factors 
was high (.77, p<.001).  
Step 2: Separate SEM of ToM and behavioural symptoms and EF and behavioural symptoms 
The SEM of ToM and the behavioural latent factors (see Figure 1a) showed good model fit 
(χ2(62)=80.51, p=.06; CFI=.963; RMSEA=.055). Paths between social communication and 
ToM (β=.43, p<.001) and RRB and ToM (β=.40, p=.001) were significant. The SEM of EF 
and the behavioural latent factors (see Figure 1b) also showed good model fit (χ2(87)=105.38, 
p=.09; CFI=.964; RMSEA = .046). Paths between social communication and EF (β=.26, p 
=.03) and RRB and EF (β=.29, p=.02) were significant. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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Step 3: Combined SEM of ToM, EF and behavioural symptoms 
The initial SEM combining paths between both cognitive latent factors and behavioural 
symptoms showed reasonable model fit (χ2(146)=213.86, p<.001; CFI=.902; RMSEA=.068). 
Paths from ToM to social communication (β=.60; p=.12) and RRBs (β=.52; p=.20), and from 
EF to social communication (β=-.22; p=.57) and RRBs (β=-.16; p=.69) were not significant. 
The correlations between cognitive (r=.86, p<.001) and behavioural (r=.73, p<.001) latent 
factors were both highly significant.  
 Non-significant paths were systematically removed, starting with the regression of 
RRBs on EF, which increased model fit (χ2(147)=214.07, p<.001; CFI=.903; RMSEA=.068). 
Subsequent removal of the regression of social communication on EF also improved fit 
(χ2(148)=214.38, p<.001; CFI=.904; RMSEA=.067) with all remaining paths significant (see 
Figure 2). Thus, the best fitting model indicates a direct association between ToM, but not 
EF, and behavioural symptoms. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Step 4: Combined SEM of ToM, EF and behavioural symptoms, controlling for receptive 
language 
The initial SEM including all paths between cognitive and behavioural latent factors as well 
as regressing all factors onto the TROG-E showed reasonable model fit (χ2(161)=232.12, 
p<.001; CFI=.908; RMSEA=.066). Initial paths from ToM to social communication (β=.66; 
p=.08) and RRBs (β=.57; p=.15), and from EF to social communication (β=-.10; p=.80) and 
RRBs (β=-.05; p=.90) were not significant. Additionally, the paths between TROG-E and 
social communication (β=.20; p=.48) and TROG-E and RRBs (β=.18; p=.40) were also non-
significant. These latter pathways represent associations that may confound the primary 
relationships of interest between cognition and behaviour. Therefore, they were maintained in 
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the model to control for these effects. The first pathway removed was between RRB and EF, 
which increased model fit (χ2(162)=232.22, p<.001; CFI=.910; RMSEA=.066). Subsequent 
removal of the path between social communication and EF improved model fit 
(χ2(163)=232.37, p<.001; CFI=.911; RMSEA=.065) and produced a final model solution 
with all paths significant apart from those between TROG-E and social communication and 
TROG-E and RRBs (see Figure 3). In summary, the model indicates an association between 
ToM and social communication and RRBs when controlling for receptive language ability.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Step 5: Combined SEM of ToM, EF and behavioural symptoms, controlling for IQ 
We were additionally interested in exploring the pattern of cognition-behaviour associations 
while controlling for full-scale IQ. The paths between EF and IQ (β=-.86; p<.001) and ToM 
and IQ (β=-.93; p<.001) were extremely high in the initial model (χ2(161)=251.62, p<.001; 
CFI=.888; RMSEA=.075). The strong effect of full-scale IQ on cognitive-behaviour 
associations can also be seen in Tables 3 and 4.  While maintaining all paths with IQ, 
systematically removing the non-significant paths between RRB and EF (χ2(162)=251.43, 
p<.001), social communication and EF (χ2(163)=250.68, p<.001), RRB and ToM 
(χ2(164)=251.82, p<.001) and social communication and ToM (χ2(165)=252.84, p<.001; CFI 
=.891; RMSEA =.073) indicated a model that did not improve in fit incrementally, albeit 
with no decreases in model fit of statistical significance (χ2 difference ≥3.84). Exploratory 
analysis with performance IQ and verbal IQ found a similar pattern for performance IQ, 
while there were issues with model convergence for verbal IQ. In summary, controlling for 
full-scale IQ produced an unstable model fitting process and no cognition-behaviour paths 
were significant.       
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Discussion 
ToM and EFs are cognitive domains argued to be central to the behavioural presentation of 
ASD. However, thorough exploration of cognitive-behaviour associations using multiple 
measures has been surprisingly limited. We addressed this by investigating ToM and EF 
capabilities in 100 adolescents with ASD, alongside parent report measures of ASD 
symptomatology. Using SEM, which meant we could account for both ToM and EF in one 
model, we established that mentalising difficulties were associated with more severe social 
communication symptoms and RRBs. In contrast, the model did not support a direct 
relationship between EF and behavioural symptoms.  
It is important to consider the auxiliary demands inherent to EF and ToM tasks that 
may confound results, although previous studies have tended not to control for non-specific 
task demands or general ability. However, we replicated our findings in a model that also 
controlled for receptive language, thus accounting for varying ability in understanding task 
demands. In contrast, our attempts to control for full-scale IQ indicated that it was too highly 
correlated with the cognitive tasks to provide sensitivity for investigating cognitive-behaviour 
associations. This may reflect recognised issues with the generalised nature of IQ 
assessments when attempting to parcel out specific cognitive or perceptual confounds (see 
Dennis et al. 2009). 
ToM and ASD symptoms 
We found that difficulties with ToM were related to the degree of autistic symptoms. 
Notably, the strength of the standardised coefficients between social communication and 
ToM and between RRBs and ToM were similar. The current study uses cross-sectional data 
and was not designed to examine bidirectional effects between cognition and behaviour. 
Therefore, although the theories under discussion describe the impact of cognition on 
behaviour, the current results cannot directly speak to causality. However, the significant 
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association between ToM and social communication symptoms fits with the argument that 
impairments in understanding other minds might underlie complex and varied impairments in 
social interaction (e.g. Frith et al. 1991). The majority of studies that have found no 
significant association have limited their measurement of ToM to false belief. Our broad 
approach included more challenging tasks that are better able to measure individual 
differences, as well as the RMET (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), which engages socio-perceptual 
processing (although see Oakley et al. 2016 for a critique of this task). Our data suggest that 
the association between ToM and autistic behaviours may be best identified by using an 
inclusive approach that goes beyond narrow measures of false belief. 
The significant association between ToM and RRBs is perhaps surprising, although 
Ronald et al (2006) found a significant relationship between parent-reported RRBs and ToM 
ability in a community sample of 9-year-old twin pairs, which persisted when verbal ability 
was controlled. However, the most common finding across the small sample of studies that 
have directly assessed this association in ASD is that ToM does not correlate with RRBs 
(Cantio et al. 2016; Joseph and Tager-Flusberg 2004; Nagar Shimoni et al. 2012; Pellicano et 
al. 2006; White et al. 2009; Wilson et al. 2014). With the exception of Cantio et al. (2016), 
these studies measured RRBs using clinical assessment through observation or parent-
interview. Both the ADOS and ADI-R have been criticised for undersampling RRBs (e.g. 
Esbensen et al. 2009) and the observational format of the ADOS favours certain RRBs (e.g. 
motor stereotypies) over others (e.g. restricted interests). In contrast, we used a targeted 
questionnaire designed to gather information about the breadth of RRBs observed in ASD. 
Despite the advantages of our measure, the reliance on parent-report measures of behaviour is 
a limitation. For example, parent-report of child behaviour can be influenced by parent 
depression (e.g. Randazzo et al. 2003) . An optimal study design would accommodate 
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multiple sources of behaviour measurement, including direct observation and a variety of 
informants (e.g. parent, teacher, self).  
When considering the theoretical link between ToM and RRBs, a bewildering social 
world due to impoverished mentalising abilities could lead to RRBs that lessen anxiety and 
reduce confusion. RRBs have been associated with anxiety in ASD and interpreted as 
forming a ‘buffer’ to alleviate anxiety (Lidstone et al. 2014). An interplay has also been 
observed between RRBs, anxiety and intolerance of uncertainty in ASD (Joyce et al. 2017; 
Wigham et al. 2015). Arguably those with poor mentalising could be more prone to 
experience social events as uncertain and unpredictable, leading to elevated anxiety.  
It is also possible that a limited understanding of or interest in how the self is 
perceived could reduce motivation to suppress or modify RRBs. Related to this, a recent 
meta-analysis has demonstrated the regions of the superior temporal gyrus and medial 
prefrontal cortex are involved in both classic ToM and self-awareness (van Veluw and 
Chance 2014), while theoretical links have been drawn between ToM and social motivation 
(Chevallier et al. 2012). Within the potentially complex relationship between social 
understanding, social motivation and RRBs, difficulties in engaging with and understanding 
the social world could lead to the development of idiosyncratic and unusually intense 
interests, and certainly to situations where RRBs ‘win out’ over more conventional and social 
pursuits. Indeed, young autistic people have described how their RRBs are used as a way to 
be alone and to avoid people  (Joyce et al. 2017). 
There may also be value in taking a developmental perspective, which recognises that 
RRBs are an intrinsic part of typical development (Evans et al. 1997). A mentalising deficit, 
including precursors such as atypical joint attention (Charman et al. 2000), could disrupt the 
experience-dependent brain and behaviour development that leads to the typical trajectory of 
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RRBs. This reflects evidence from animal models in which restricted environments produce 
elevated repetitive behaviours (Lewis and Kim 2009).  
In summary, the current study suggests that the theoretical position that ToM is not 
relevant to RRBs needs reconsidering. We suggest that there may be multiple ways in which 
ToM might associate with RRBs and that taking a fine-grained approach, which enables 
investigation of RRB subtypes, may prove illuminating.  
EF and ASD symptoms 
Our simple model of EF and behaviour showed a significant association between EF and both 
RRBs and social communication.. However, our aim was to model EF and ToM 
simultaneously, thus controlling for the association between these variables as well as the 
effects of concurrent cognitive-behaviour associations.  Using this technique, which is novel 
to the field, we failed to find a direct association between EFs and autistic behaviours. 
Therefore, we have concluded that EFs have no unique association with autistic behaviours 
but have an indirect effect through their association with ToM. This strong association 
between EF and ToM is an established finding (e.g. Pellicano 2007)    
We measured EF as a composite of a variety of executive skills, which aligned with 
our parsimonious approach and avoided issues with identifying distinct EFs, which are rarely 
isolated in any one executive task (Van Eylen et al. 2015). However, hypotheses have been 
made about specific executive abilities and specific RRBs, for example, poor generativity 
restricting the range of behaviours (Turner 1997), and there is some evidence that different 
EFs have differential association with RRBs (e.g. Kenworthy et al. 2009; Lopez et al. 2005). 
Further, RRBs are often considered as two distinct subtypes, repetitive sensory and motor 
behaviours and insistence on sameness (see Barrett et al. 2015), with some evidence of 
distinct relationships with EF (Mosconi et al. 2009).  A limitation of our parsimonious 
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approach is that it did not allow for this type of nuanced investigation, which could prove 
informative in future work. It is also worth considering Brunsdon et al.’s (2015) finding that 
the number of cognitive tasks  on which participants performed atypically correlated 
positively with autistic symptoms. Further research that explores the cumulative effect of 
difficulties with both ToM and EF could be beneficial.  
Although our data do not suggest a direct association between EFs and behaviour, the 
Triple I hypothesis (White 2013) argues EF deficits are driven by difficulties in ‘Inferring 
Implicit Information’. This theory suggests that difficulties relevant to mentalising drive the 
pattern of impairment across executive tasks. In support, children with ASD fare better on 
structured executive tasks compared to open-ended tasks, where the correct behaviour has to 
be implicitly inferred (Van Eylen et al. 2015). The Triple I hypothesis would not predict a 
strong association between EF and ASD symptoms but would predict our observed 
correlation between EF and ToM. Indeed, two of our EF tasks, planning drawing and card 
sort, had particularly high demands in terms of requiring inference, and open-endedness is 
inherent in generativity tasks.  
However, our previous research, also using the SNAP sample, found evidence that 
poorer executive skills related to higher levels of anxiety (Hollocks et al. 2014), which has 
subsequently been replicated (Lawson et al. 2015; Wallace et al. 2016). It may be that the 
pathway between EFs and RRBs is indirect and mediated by anxiety. For example, poorer 
cognitive control could lead to hyperattentiveness to negative information and subsequent 
anxiety (see Hollocks et al., 2014); attempts to manage the anxiety could then lead to RRBs 
(see Spiker et al. 2012). As far as we are aware, this mediation hypothesis has yet to be 
tested.  
EFs also distinguish themselves from ToM by being prevalent across other 
developmental disorders, particularly attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (see 
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Craig et al. 2016). Our population was drawn from SNAP, 28% of whom met criteria for co-
morbid ADHD (Simonoff et al. 2008). There is evidence of shared genetic overlap between 
autistic and ADHD traits, which is particularly strong for RRBs (Polderman et al. 2013; 
Ronald et al. 2014; Taylor et al. 2015). Within this context, it could be argued that the 
strength of association between RRBs and EFs is being tempered by complex comorbidity. 
This is consistent with the research domains criteria (RDoC) initiative that proposes 
behaviour and cognition should be considered within a dimensional framework, unrestricted 
by diagnostic classification (Insel et al. 2010). Related to this, our population was confined to 
those with an ASD diagnosis, and therefore levels of RRBs and social communicative 
difficulties were high; whether the pattern of results would replicate in a population with a 
broader range of symptom presentation remains to be established. 
An important consideration when interpreting the current findings is that ASD is a 
developmental disorder and the current study took a snapshot of cognitive-behaviour 
associations in adolescence. Pellicano (2013) found that executive skills of 4-7 year old 
children with ASD predicted both social communication abilities and RRBs three years later, 
with no predictive relationship established for ToM. Therefore, executive difficulties might 
become less directly relevant to autistic symptoms as development progresses. Both cognitive 
task performance and behavioural symptoms could be moderated by the development of 
compensatory strategies, be they externally imposed or internally generated (e.g. avoidance 
of triggers; use of communication or organisational tools; social rule learning), which would 
dilute the degree of association. Alongside the limitation of a cross-sectional design, we were 
also restricted to exploring ASD at the group level. Phenotypic heterogeneity is a recognised 
characteristic of the disorder (e.g. Georgiades et al. 2013) and our approach may have 
masked distinct subgroups.  
Concluding comments 
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In a modelling approach that considered co-occurring cognitive and behaviour associations, 
we present evidence that ToM ability, but not EF ability, is directly associated with both 
social communication and RRBs in adolescents with ASD. This finding suggests that training 
in ToM may impact positively on autistic behaviours. A recent Cochrane review of ToM 
interventions in ASD concluded that although ToM can be taught, evidence of generalisation 
beyond task performance was limited (Fletcher-Watson et al. 2014). However, the authors 
called for more longitudinal research and improved outcome measures to better evaluate the 
effectiveness of ToM interventions.  
 The multiple deficit account would have predicted that ToM associated uniquely with 
social communication symptoms and that EFs associated uniquely with RRB symptoms 
(Brunsdon and Happé 2014). However, there are many reasons why a single cognitive deficit 
is an unlikely explanation, particularly the low correlation between core behavioural features 
in both the general (Ronald et al. 2006) and autistic (Dworzynski et al. 2009) population. 
These core behaviours also have relatively independent heritability (e.g. Ronald et al., 2006; 
see Happé & Ronald (2008) for a fuller discussion). Although further research with large 
sample sizes and multiple measures are required, the data presented here question whether a 
simple cognition-behaviour relationship for EFs and RRBs exists. Our findings also suggest 
that the relationship between ToM and RRBs needs to be re-examined both theoretically and 
experimentally.  
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Figures 
Figure 1: Separate structural equation models of ToM and behavioural symptoms and EF and 
behavioural symptoms (Step 2 of SEM analysis)  
Animations = Frith-Happé animations; Plan draw = Planning drawing; EF = executive 
functions; RMET = Reading the mind in the eyes task; SRS = Social Responsiveness Scale; 
ToM = Theory of mind; RBS = Repetitive Behavior Scale-Revised; RRBs = Restricted and 
repetitive behaviours 
 
Figure 2: Combined structural equation model of ToM, EF and behavioural symptoms (Step 
3 of SEM analysis) Animations = Frith-Happé animations; Plan draw = Planning drawing; 
EF = executive functions; RMET = Reading the mind in the eyes task; SRS = Social 
Responsiveness Scale; ToM = Theory of mind; RBS = Repetitive Behavior Scale-Revised; 
RRBs = Restricted and repetitive behaviours 
 
Figure 3: Combined SEM of ToM, EF and behavioural symptoms, controlling for receptive 
language (Step 4 of SEM analysis) 
Dotted lines represent non-significant paths, including the regression of TROG-E on social 
communication behaviours (β=.23, p = .31) and the regression of TROG-E on RRBs (β=.19, 
p = .42). Animations = Frith-Happé animations; Plan draw = Planning drawing; EF = 
executive functions; RMET = Reading the mind in the eyes task; TROG-E = Test of 
Reception for Grammar; SRS = Social Responsiveness Scale; ToM = Theory of mind; RBS = 
Repetitive Behavior Scale-Revised; RRBs = Restricted and repetitive behaviours 
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Table 1: Summary of tasks used. 
Task  Key variable Number of 
trials 
Score 
range 
Reference for 
task procedure* 
Theory of Mind     
FB  1st and 2nd 
order FB score 
(sum) 
2 stories. 
Three FB 
questions (1 
1st order; 2 
2nd order) 
and 3 
justification 
questions. 
0-8 Bowler (1992); 
Hughes et al. 
(2000); 
Sullivan et al. 
(1994) 
Strange 
stories 
 Mentalising 
score 
(average) 
4 theory of 
mind stories 
0-2 Ricketts et al. 
(2013) 
Animations  Mentalising 
(intentionality) 
score 
(average) 
4 theory of 
mind 
animations 
0-5 Jones et al. 
(2011) 
RMET  Total correct 28 0-28 Baron-Cohen et 
al. (2001) 
Executive functions     
Opposite 
Worlds 
 Inhibition cost 
score 
4 - Manly et al. 
(2001) 
Card sort  Number of 
errors 
3 0-60 Tregay et al. 
(2009) 
Category  
fluency  
 Number of 
correct 
responses 
2 - Tregay, 
Gilmour, and 
Charman 
(2009) 
Design 
fluency 
 Number of 
correct 
responses 
1 - Jones-Gotman 
and Milner 
(1977) 
Digit span 
(backwards) 
 Raw score Variable 0-14 Cohen (1997) 
Planning 
drawing 
 Planning score 
(sum) 
3 0-6 Booth et al. 
(2003) 
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* Further details for each task provided in online supplementary materials. Animations = 
Frith-Happé animations; CMS = Children’s Memory Scale; FB = False belief; RMET = 
Reading the mind in the eyes task; TEA-Ch= Test of Everyday Attention for Children.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. The listed tasks were the indicator variables for each of the 
four latent factors (Theory of Mind, Executive function, Social communication, Restricted 
and Repetitive Beahviours) used in the models.  
 Obs. Mean SD Range 
Verbal IQ 100 80.81 18.04 55-120 
Performance IQ 100 90.37 18.61 53-126 
Full scale IQ 100 84.31 18.03 50-119 
TROG-E 98 82.89 17.20 55-109 
Cognition: Theory of Mind    
False belief 99 4.75 2.42 0-8 
Strange stories 88 .85 .52 0-2 
Animations 87 2.87 .94 0-4.75 
RMET 94 17.02 4.44 6-25 
Cognition: Executive function    
Opposite worlds 98 8.37 7.49 -3.71-47.42 
Card sort 98 7.24 6.62 1-36 
Category fluency 97 35.27 11.31 9-78 
Design fluency 94 7.91 4.00 0-23 
Digit span 99 4.66 2.46 0-12 
Planning drawing 98 3.56 1.70 0-6 
Behaviour: Social communication   
SRS Social awareness 92 11.83 4.19 2-21 
SRS Social cognition 92 17.13 6.55 0-31 
SRS Social communication 92 13.58 10.22 2-50 
SRS Social motivation 92 15.51 5.67 4-26 
Behaviour: Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours  
RBS-R Stereotypy 82 .42 .48 0-2.22 
RBS-R Self injurious 86 .18 .28 0-1.50 
RBS-R Compulsive 89 .39 .48 0-2.50 
28 
RBS-R Ritualistic/Sameness 85 .51 .43 0-1.75 
RBS-R Restricted  90 1.08 .86 0-3.00 
Animations, Frith-Happé animations; RMET, Reading the mind in the eyes task; SRS, Social 
Responsiveness Scale, RBS, Repetitive Behavior Scale-Revised 
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Table 3: Correlations between cognitive tasks and the social communication and restricted 
and repetitive behaviour latent factors 
 Social communication RRB 
Theory of mind   
False belief .30** (-.05) .32** (.01) 
Strange stories .20 (.01) .18* (-.03) 
F-H animations .18 (.02) .25* (.19) 
RMET .31** (.17) .29** (.13) 
Executive functions   
Opposite worlds .16 (.02) .23* (.07) 
Card sort .23* (-.02) .23* (-.02) 
Category fluency .18 (.12) .22* (.17) 
Design fluency .04 (-.14) .05 (-.13) 
Digit span .21* (.12) .22* (.12) 
Planning drawing .14 (.05) .16 (.06) 
 
F-H animations, Frith-Happé animations; FSIQ, full-scale IQ; RMET, Reading the mind in 
the eyes task. RRB, restricted and repetitive behaviours *** p < .001,** p < .01,* p < .05 
Correlations in brackets are partialled for FSIQ. 
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Table 4: Correlations between social communication and restricted and repetitive behaviour 
variables and the theory of mind and executive function latent factors 
 Theory of Mind Executive functions 
Social communication   
SRS Social awareness .34** (.19) .24* (.06) 
SRS Social cognition .41*** (.25*) .31** (.11) 
SRS Social communication .35** (.22) .20 (-.02) 
SRS Social motivation .28** (.07) .20 (-.08) 
Restricted and repetitive behaviours  
RBS-R Stereotypy .49*** (.31**) .39*** (.12) 
RBS-R Self injurious .23* (.14) .19 (.07) 
RBS-R Compulsive .34** (-.01) .21* (-.18) 
RBS-R Ritualistic/Sameness .28* (.19) .20 (.09) 
RBS-R Restricted  .29** (.22) .21 (.09) 
 
SRS, Social Responsiveness Scale, RBS, Repetitive Behaviour Scale-Revised *** p < 
.001,** p < .01,* p < .05 Correlations in brackets are partialled for FSIQ. 
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